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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's most recent growth-management legislation mandates
that government construction of public facilities keep pace with pri-
vate construction of new homes, offices, shopping centers, and indus-
trial parks. This innovative comprehensive planning law requires
cities and counties to adopt regulations prohibiting private construc-
tion projects, if public facilities do not have sufficient capacity to serve
proposed projects and the existing population. Municipalities deny-
ing development proposals due to government's failure to keep pace
with the demand for public services may face exposure to damages
from developers who claim that such regulations are an invalid exer-
cise of the police power.
Section II of this Comment examines Florida's new growth-man-
agement legislation, and Section III examines judicial decisions,
which will affect the ability of local governments to implement this
legislation. In addition, Section IV analyzes the types of fact patterns
which may arise when municipalities deny development proposals due
to inadequate public facilities. This analysis describes the takings
arguments that developers may use to convince Florida courts to
award damages or to invalidate regulations prohibiting private devel-
opment due to the lack of adequate public facilities. Furthermore,
Section IV examines government counterarguments and modifications
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to regulations that prevent takings problems. Finally, Section V con-
cludes with recommendations to local governments for drafting and
administering land development regulations which both comply with
the new legislation and avoid takings claims.
II. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION ACT
In 1985, the Florida Legislature repealed the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975' and enacted expanded plan-
ning legislation entitled the Local Government Comprehensive Plan-
ning and Land Development Regulation Act (the Act).2 The Act
imposed two new significant requirements on local government.'
First, the Act requires each local government to adopt a capital
improvements element (CIE) of its comprehensive plan.4 The CIE
must assess existing deficiencies in public facilities and the need for
new facilities for at least the next five years.' The local government
must identify funding sources and estimate the cost of planned facili-
ties.6 Additionally, the local government must adopt standards to
ensure acceptable levels of service for each type of public facility.7
Second, the Act requires each local government to adopt and
enforce land development regulations that conform to its comprehen-
1. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(8) (1987).
2. 1987 FLA. LAWS ch. 85.55, §§ 1-20 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (1987).
3. The head of the governor's planning staff described the capital improvements and
service standards elements of the Act as "[t]he most significant addition" to local
comprehensive planning in Florida. O'Connel, New Directions in State Legislation: The
Florida Growth Management Act and State Comprehensive Plan, 1986 INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 6-1, 6-22 to 6-23.
4. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3) (1987). The Act also requires the eight comprehensive plan
elements mandated by the 1975 Act: (a) future land use element; (b) traffic circulation
element; (c) general sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water and aquifer recharge
protection element; (d) conservation element; (e) recreation and open space element; (f)
housing element; (g) coastal management element; and (h) intergovernmental coordination
element. Id. § 163.3177(6). Additionally, the Act lists ten optional plan elements: (a) mass
transit element; (b) port, aviation, and related facilities element; (c) recreational traffic
circulation element; (d) offstreet parking facilities element; (e) public buildings and related
facilities element; (f) recommended community design element; (g) general area
redevelopment element; (h) safety element; (i) historic and scenic preservation element; fi)
economic element; (k) and any other necessary element. Id. § 163.3177(3)(b). These optional
elements are required if the local governmental unit has a population greater than 50,000, as
determined under id. § 186.901 (the statute erroneously cites to id. § 186.091).
5. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a). The five-year CIE must be reviewed annually and amended as
necessary. Id. § 163.3177(3)(b).
6. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a)(2).
7. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a)(3). Public facilities include transportation, sanitary sewer, solid
waste, drainage, potable water, education, and health facilities. Id. § 163.3164(23).
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sive plan.' Land development regulations must provide necessary
public facilities for proposed development, at or in excess of, the stan-
dards adopted in the CIE.9 Furthermore, local regulations must con-
dition approval of development permits1° on the availability of public
facilities necessary to serve proposed projects. " Finally, local govern-
ments must deny any development permit "which results in a reduc-
tion in the level of services for the affected public facilities below the
level of services provided in the [capital improvement element of the]
comprehensive plan of the local government."' 2
These two requirements mandate that cities and counties deny
development approval to any project that, for example, results in
additional traffic on an already congested roadway, or causes a road-
way to exceed its capacity as defined by the local CIE. 3 If a public
facility is already operating below the service standard and the pro-
posed development results in a further reduction in service, project
approval must be denied.' 4 Additionally, if the public facility meets
or exceeds the service standard, but the proposed development results
in a reduction in service below the standard, the local government
cannot approve the project.' 5 Finally, if a project results in a reduc-
tion in services below the standard established in the CIE, the devel-
oper can wait until the local government builds an improved facility,
or the developer can agree to construct the improvement to meet the
municipality's standards as a condition of project approval.' 6 The
developer can also build its project and the necessary public facilities
in phases to ensure that governmental facilities are available concur-
rent with the impacts of development.' 7
8. Id. § 163.3202(1).
9. Id. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(2)(g).
10. Id. Development permits are broadly defined in FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(7).
11. Id. § 16 3 .3 20 2 (2)(g).
12. Id.
13. The Act also requires denial of development permits for projects that would over
burden sewer, solid waste, drainage, water, education and health facilities. See supra note 7.
14. Although the actual language of FLA. STAT. § 16 3 .3202(2)(g) arguably can be limited
to situations in which the facility is operating at or above the service standard before the
proposed project is built, at least one local government implementing the Act has not so
limited this language. See PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, art. V, §§ 1-2
(Sept. 22, 1987).
15. FLA. STAT. § 16 3 .3 2 02(2)(g) (1987).
16. Id. §§ 163.3177(10)(h), 16 3 .3 2 02 (g).
17. Id. § 163.3177(10)(h).
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III. REGULATORY TAKING CASES
A. Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo
In Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo,I8 the New York Court
of Appeals upheld a plan similar to the Act, which linked develop-
ment approvals to the provision of adequate public facilities.' 9 In
response to rapid population growth and problems in providing ade-
quate service, Ramapo, New York, adopted a new master plan, an
eighteen-year capital improvement program, and amended its zoning
code to require special permits for all new subdivisions.20 Ramapo
conditioned special permit approval upon the availability of adequate
sewers, drainage, parks, roads, and fire protection services for the pro-
posed development project.2 ' If adequate services were not available
when the prospective developer applied for plat approval, the town
would deny the application but could grant "a present right to pro-
ceed with residential development in such year as the development
meets the required point minimum, but in no event later than the final
year of the 18 year capital plan."' 22 The applicant could wait up to
eighteen years to subdivide his property or could advance the date of
plat approval by agreeing to construct or to provide the municipal
facilities and services required to generate sufficient points for project
approval.23
The New York Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was not
confiscatory because Ramapo's zoning ordinance was only a tempo-
rary restriction "designed to operate for a maximum period of 18
years."' 24 The court stated:
An ordinance which seeks to permanently restrict the use of
property so that it may not be used for any reasonable purpose
18. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972).
19. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
20. Id. at 367-68, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
21. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44. Each proposed plat received
points based on the availability of the five municipal services listed in the ordinance. Id. A
minimum score of 15 points was required for approval of a special permit. Id.
22. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
23. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
24. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155. The court also rejected the
property owners' claims that linking development approvals to the provision of adequate
public facilities exceeded the town's delegated authority under New York's zoning enabling
act. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
Judges Breitel and Jason dissented on the grounds that Ramapo had no delegated
authority under New York law to postpone growth in this manner. Id. at 386, 285 N.E.2d at
306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158. Judge Breitel's dissent did not address the takings issue because, in
his opinion, "the Ramapo ordinance is destroyed at the threshold" due to lack of statutory
authority. Id. at 389, 285 N.E.2d at 309, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
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must be recognized as a taking: .... An appreciably different
situation obtains where the restriction constitutes a temporary
restriction, providing that the property may be put to a profitable
use within a reasonable time.25
The property owners challenging the ordinance argued that this
temporary program severely diminished the value of their land, pre-
cluding all economically beneficial use of the property.26 The court
reasoned that, although the value of undeveloped property would be
substantially diminished, the ordinance would not effect a taking
"unless it can be shown that the measure is either unreasonable in
terms of necessity or the diminution in value is such as to be tanta-
mount to a confiscation.
27
The New York Court of Appeals determined that the Ramapo
ordinance satisfied both prongs of this test. First, Ramapo's growth
management program did not diminish property value to such an
extent "to be tantamount to a confiscation" because the zoning
restrictions, although "substantial in nature and duration," were not
"absolute. ' 2 The restrictions were not absolute and did not result in
a taking because they were only temporary regulations, due to expire
in eighteen years.29
Second, the ordinance was not "unreasonable in terms of neces-
sity" because it imposed "restrictions of a certain duration,"30 based
on a substantiated need for improved public facilities to serve the
town's rapidly growing population.3' Additionally, under the Ramapo
ordinance, property could be developed within a reasonable time and
at an appreciated value, due to the town's investment in public serv-
* 32ices. Moreover, taxable property values were reduced in the interim
to compensate for the effect of the development ban.33 Therefore, the
court concluded that the Ramapo plan did not result in an unconsti-
tutional taking.34 Because the Town of Ramapo lacked resources to
construct public facilities to keep pace with its growth, the Town
Board had a rational basis for enacting its phased-growth zoning
25. Id. at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
27. Id. at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
28. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
29. Id. The court also noted that property owners could accelerate development approval
by constructing public improvements at their own expense. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Ramapo conducted extensive studies prior to adopting the zoning ordinance and
capital improvement plan. Id. at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
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B. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles
The United States Supreme Court apparently rejected the reason-
ing of Golden in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-
dale v. County of Los Angeles.36 In First English, Los Angeles County
adopted an interim flood protection ordinance, prohibiting any con-
struction within the flood prone area described in the ordinance.37 A
church's recreational camp, which had been destroyed by a flood a
year before Los Angeles County adopted the ordinance, was within
the flood zone area protected by the ordinance.38 A month after Los
Angeles County adopted the interim flood protection ordinance, the
church filed an action for damages, alleging, inter alia, that the ordi-
nance denied the church all use of its property.39
The Supreme Court did not determine whether a taking
occurred,40 or whether the ordinance was justified as a valid public
safety measure.4' Chief Justice Rehnquist directed that those issues
be determined on remand.42 Instead the Court decided the only
35. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
36. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
37. Id. at 2381.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2382. The trial court dismissed the church's takings claim, and the appeals
court affirmed, based on the California Supreme Court precedent that damages are not
available to remedy a regulatory taking. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275-77, 598
P.2d 25, 29-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376-78 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
40. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384. The Court did not determine whether a taking
occurred because the lower court did not consider the issue. Id. Because the lower courts
assumed that, even if the church's takings allegations were true, no damage remedy was
available for a temporary regulatory taking, a majority of the Supreme Court found a ripe
constitutional issue and avoided the procedural obstacles that prevented a decision in four
earlier cases. Id. at 2383-84. See McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340
(1986) (The Court could not determine whether a taking occurred when the county denied
subdivision approval because the county made no final and authoritative decision on the
application of the challenged regulations to the plaintiff's property.); Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (The bank's claim was not
ripe for determination because it failed to seek variances of the zoning regulations.); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (dismissing appeal for lack of
jurisdiction and not deciding whether a taking occurred, although the lower court decided
damages were not an appropriate remedy); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (The
zoning ordinance did not facially take the plaintiff's property, and the Court could not
determine whether the ordinance was confiscatory, as applied to the plaintiff's property,
because the plaintiff failed to submit a development plan.).
41. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
42. "These questions, [whether the ordinance denied the church all use of its property, and
whether 'the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety
regulations'] of course, remain open for decision on . . . remand." Id. at 2385.
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remaining issue: "whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the
government to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings."43 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote that "'temporary' takings which . . . deny a
landowner use of his property, are not different in kind from perma-
nent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensa-
tion."" Based on this reasoning, the Court held that, if a government
regulation effects a taking of the claimant's property, the claimant is
entitled to damages for the period of time the regulation prevented all
use of the property.45
C. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,46 the Supreme Court
held that the commission could not constitutionally condition
approval of a building permit upon the property owner's grant of a
public access easement across his property." The Nollans had an
option to purchase a beachfront lot on the condition that they demol-
ish the dilapidated bungalow situated on the property and build a new
house.4" The California Coastal Commission granted permit approval
for the proposed house on the condition that the Nollans grant a pub-
lic access easement across their property. 49 The Nollans sought
review of the commission's order and prevailed in the Superior
Court.50 While the commission's appeal was pending, the Nollans
constructed the new house without a permit and purchased the
property.5'
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2388.
45. Id. at 2389.
46. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
47. Id. at 3150.
48. Id. at 3143.
49. Id. The Nollans' lot was located between two public beaches. Id. The proposed
access easement would have improved the public's ability to walk between the two public
beaches. Id.
50. The Superior Court granted the Nollans' motion for a writ of administrative
mandamus, invalidating the access requirement, on the basis that the commission did not show
that the proposed construction "would have a direct adverse impact on public access to the
beach." Id. On remand, the commission reaffirmed the permit condition on the grounds that
the proposed house and other construction in the area would cumulatively and adversely
impact public access along the beach. Id. at 3143-44. The Nollans filed a supplemental
petition claiming that the permit condition violated the fifth amendment just compensation
clause. Id. at 3144. The Superior Court granted the supplemental vrit on statutory grounds.
Id.
51. Id. at 3144. The California Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court, finding that
the California Coastal Act of 1976 authorized the commission to impose the permit condition.
Id. The court also ruled against the Nollans' takings claim "because, although the condition
diminished the value of the Nollans' lot, it did not deprive them of all reasonable use of their
property." Id. (citing California Coastal Comm'n v. Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 722-23,
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia observed that, if the state
required a property owner to convey a public access easement out-
right, rather than as a condition of permit approval, there undoubt-
edly would be a taking.5 2 Scalia stated that a public access easement
is a " 'permanent physical occupation' "13 of private property by gov-
ernment and is therefore a taking "'without regard to whether the
action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner.' , Once the Court concluded that
requiring the conveyance of a public access easement was a taking,
"the question [became] whether requiring it to be conveyed as a con-
dition for issuing a land use permit alters the outcome.
55
The Court's test to determine if the easement dedication was a
valid condition of permit approval was whether the regulatory condi-
tion " 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' "56 Applying
this test to the facts in Nollan, the Court found that, even if the state
could constitutionally prohibit the Nollans' construction project "in
order to protect the public's view of the beach,"57 granting permit
approval conditioned on conveyance of a public access easement vio-
lated the just compensation clause.
5 8
Although prohibiting construction of a new house on the Nol-
lans' lot may be a valid exercise of the police 'power, "if the condition
substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition," the condition is a
taking. 59 Lack of the necessary nexus between the legitimate state
interest served by the construction prohibition and the restriction sub-
stituted for the prohibition converts the legitimate state interest into a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
6
0
223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1986)). The Nollans then appealed the Court of Appeal's
decision concerning the takings claim to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 3145 (1987).
52. 107 S. Ct. at 3145 ("[A]ppropriation of a public easement across a landowner's
premises ... constitute[s] the taking of a property interest.")
53. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(1982)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3146.
56. Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Justice Scalia
rejected the rational basis test as applied to due process or equal protection claims in takings
cases. Id. at 3147 n.3. He stated that "[w]e have required that the regulation [in takings cases]
substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved." Id. (quoting
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
57. Id. at 3148.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. "[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-
1210
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The Court, however, did not determine "how close a 'fit' between
the condition and the burden" was required for the condition to
advance substantially a legitimate state interest,6' for it concluded
that the permit condition was a taking, even under California's
untailored reasonable relationship standard.62 But the Court did note
that it was particularly concerned about the extent to which a land
use restriction advances the state interest "where the actual convey-
ance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land use
restriction."63
IV. HYPOTHETICAL TAKINGS DISPUTES UNDER THE ACT
First English and Nollan establish that a temporary land use reg-
ulation that does not advance substantially a legitimate state interest,
can result in a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.64 Consequently, local governments implementing the
Act65 must now be concerned with exposure to claims arising from
regulations that temporarily prohibit landowners from developing
their property 66 and must ensure that land development regulations
further a valid police power concern, which is the basis for the regula-
tion.67 The three hypothetical situations discussed below highlight
these issues.
All three hypotheticals are based on the following circumstances.
A developer, ABC Trust, owns 105 acres of land located in City A,
Florida. Five acres are designated commercial, and the remaining
100 acres are designated residential-three units per acre-on City
A's land use plan. ABC's property is zoned A-1 Agricultural. A site
plan has not been approved, and building permits have not been
issued for ABC's property. If ABC's property is developed, the level
of service of all facilities, with the exception of roads, will not be
out plan of extortion.' " Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432
A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981).
61. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
62. The commission argued that its permit condition was "reasonably related to the public
need or burden that the Nollan's new house creates or to which it contributes." Id. (emphasis
added). The court responded: "We can accept, for purposes of discussion, the Commission's
[reasonably related] test as to how close a 'fit' between the condition and the burden is
required, because we find that this case does not meet even the most untailored standards." Id.
63. Id. at 3150. The Court's heightened scrutiny of land use regulations requiring
conveyance of property is based on the increased risk that the regulation is designed to avoid
the just compensation requirement rather than to further a valid objective of the police power.
Id.
64. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150; First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
65. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (1987).
66. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
67. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148-50.
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reduced below the service standard adopted by City A as required by
the Act.68 City A has adopted a Traffic Code,69 setting standards to
assess the impact of proposed land development projects on roads in
City A pursuant to the Act. The Traffic Code adopts level of service C
(LOS C)7° for major thoroughfares in the city and provides that the
City Council shall deny any development permit7" that would result
in a reduction in the level of service for a major thoroughfare below
LOS C.72
A. First Hypothetical
ABC Trust applies to rezone its property from A-i, Agricultural
to B-1, Neighborhood Shopping District, for the five acres designated
commercial on the land use plan, and to RS-3, Residential Single
Family District, for the 100 acres designated residential on the land
use plan. City A determines that ABC's proposed project would com-
ply with the city code and would not have a negative impact on the
city's public facilities, with one exception. A two-mile long section of
Fourth Avenue, a four-lane divided street which provides the only
means of ingress and egress to the ABC Trust property, currently car-
ries an average of 29,550 trips per day. If the ABC project is built,
Fourth Avenue would carry 35,1.50 average daily trips. The addi-
tional 5,600 trips attributable to ABC's project 7 3 would decrease the
level of service on Fourth Avenue from LOS C to LOS D, in violation
68. I assume that sufficient right-of-way exists to construct the required road
improvements and that the levels of service for the other seven types of public facilities defined
in FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(23) are not reduced below the city's standards.
69. This hypothetical traffic code is based on the Traffic Performance Code of Palm Beach
County, Florida, adopted by the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners,
effective September 25, 1987. This Code was adopted pursuant to the Act. PALM BEACH
COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, fifth Whereas clause, at 1 (Sept. 22, 1987).
70. LOS C is characterized by "average travel speeds of about 50 percent of the average
free flow speed" of the roadway. TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
HIGHWAY CAPACITY MANUAL 11-4 (1985). "The average free flow speed should
approximate the desired speeds of the motorists for the given facility and its use." Id. at 11-6
(emphasis in original). See also PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, art. V,
§ 2(A)(3) table I (Sept. 22, 1987) (the table shows the point at which LOS C crosses to LOS D
for each roadway type).
71. The Traffic Code adopts by reference the definition of development permit in FLA.
STAT. § 163.3164(7).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3202( 2 )(g) (1987). The Traffic Code mandates permit denial for
projects that would generate traffic that would reduce the LOS of a road operating at or below
LOS C to a traffic count that exceeds LOS C. The ordinance also requires permit denial for
proposed projects that would generate additional traffic on roads already operating above LOS
C, when the city is reviewing the development permit application. See PALM BEACH COUNTY,
FLA., ORDINANCE. 87-18, art. V, § 2(A)(1) (Sept. 22, 1987).
73. ABC Trust plans to build a shopping center on its commercial parcel and 300 single-
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of the Traffic Code.74
City A informs ABC Trust that, according to the city's capital
improvement program, Fourth Avenue will be expanded to six lanes
in five years. 75  Given the circumstances the city tells ABC that,
unless it agrees to construct the road improvement sooner, as a condi-
tion of rezoning approval,76 the city will be unable to approve ABC's
rezoning request for four years.77
City A, however, offers to rezone fifteen acres of ABC's residen-
tial land from A-I to RS-3 to allow ABC to proceed with plans to
family homes on its residential land. The Traffic Code calculates the traffic generated by
ABC's proposal as follows:
1) A 40,000 square foot retail center can be built on the five acre commercial parcel.
2) The trip generation rate is 100 trips/I,000 square feet of leasable area. Therefore, the
retail center would generate 4,000 trips per day. Kimley-Horn & Assocs., Inc., Palm Beach
County Trip Generation Rates (consultants' report).
3) The total number of trips is reduced by the 35% capture rate, which applies to retail
centers of less than 100,000 square feet. See PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18,
art. VI, § 2(7) table 4 (Sept. 22, 1987). The ordinance defines "captured trips" as "[t]rips
generated by a PROPOSED PROJECT which are passing trips already on the road LINK on
which the PROPOSED PROJECT is located." Id. at art. III. The 4,000 trips generated per
day would result in 1,400 captured trips per day (35% of 4,000). By deducting the captured
trips per day (1,400) from the total trips generated per day (4,000) the total daily trips
attributable to a five acre retail center can be determined-2,600.
4) 100 acres X 3 dwelling units per acre = 300 dwelling units.
5) 300 dwelling units X 10 trips/day/dwelling unit = 3,000 trips per day attributable to
300 single-family homes. Kimley-Horn & Assocs., Inc., Palm Beach County Trip Generation
Rates (consultants' report).
6) Total trips: 2,600 + 3,000 = 5,600 average daily trips.
74. The threshold of LOS D on a four-lane divided roadway is 30,000 average daily trips.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, art. V, § 2(A)(3) table I (Sept. 22, 1987).
75. The road project is included in the fifth year of the city's CIE. The Act states that
each local government capital plan "shall cover at least a 5-year period." FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3177(3)(a)(1) (1987).
76. Alternatively, the city could require ABC to pay an impact fee equal to the cost of the
road construction project. Most transportation impact fee systems require developers either to
construct the required improvements or to pay a fee in lieu of building the improvement. E.g.
BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 81-16, § 5-198(a)(5)(a)-(b) (Mar. 19, 1981);
BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., RESOLUTION 84-2178, § 4 policy 9(a), (e) (Sept. 18, 1984).
Because the cost of expanding Fourth Avenue exceeds the impact of ABC's project on the
road, the city must, however, refund any amounts ABC pays in excess of its impact. See infra
note 92.
77. The City could approve the rezoning in four years-two years prior to completion of
the road improvement, assuming the road construction project is scheduled to commence in
five years and will take one year to build-because the city determined that ABC's project
would not be approved, built, in operation, and generating traffic for approximately two years
after a zoning amendment is approved. The City A Traffic Code and the Act require that
public facilities be available concurrent with the impacts of the proposed development, and
ABC's development would have no traffic impact (other than temporary construction traffic)
until it is built. See PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, art. III and art. V,
§ 2(A)(l) (Sept. 22, 1987); see also FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(h) (1987).
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build forty-five single family homes.78 ABC refuses to amend its
rezoning application to cover only fifteen acres. ABC also refuses to
agree to spend $1,200,000 to expand Fourth Avenue79 because it
believes the project's impact is insufficient to warrant this large an
expense.8 0 The city responds by denying ABC's rezoning application.
ABC brings an action for an injunction and for damages,8 alleg-
ing that City A's refusal to rezone ABC's property, constitutes a tak-
78. The current volume of traffic on Fourth Avenue is 29,550 trips per day, 450 trips short
of the LOS D threshold. Therefore, the city could agree to rezoning approval for forty-five
homes, without exceeding the LOS D threshold (15 acres X 3 units/acre X 10 trips/home).
See supra note 74.
By offering an alternative to ABC's application, City A is indicating that, if ABC amends
its application, the city will approve a request to rezone fifteen acres from A-I to RS-3, but
that the city will not approve any rezoning request allowing ABC to build more than forty-five
homes. This should eliminate ABC's need to exhaust its administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to challenging City A's ordinance in court as a regulatory taking of ABC's
property. See McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); see also supra note 40.
The city's offer to approve an amended rezoning application may defeat ABC's takings
claim on the merits because the city's action (denying a 105 acre rezoning but agreeing to
rezone 15 acres) may not "preclude[] all economically reasonable use of the property."
Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla. 1981). I will assume for the
purposes of this hypothetical that ABC's claim is ripe and that the dimunition in value is
severe enough to support a takings claim because my objective is to analyze the relationship
between the permit condition and the police power under Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
79. In 1986 the average construction cost of a one-lane mile of road was $300,000,
exclusive of right-of-way. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and
Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 90 (1987). The affected link of Fourth Avenue is
two-miles long and is proposed for expansion from four lanes to six lanes.
80. A six-lane divided road can carry 16,400 more cars per day than a four-lane divided
road at the LOS D minimum threshold. PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18 art.
V, § 2(A)(3) table I (Sept. 22, 1987). ABC's project only generates 5,600 cars per day on
Fourth Avenue; therefore, ABC should not pay more than one-third of the cost of expanding
Fourth Avenue.
81. The Florida Supreme Court has maintained, that "[i]f a zoning ordinance is
confiscatory, the relief available is a judicial determination that the ordinance is unenforceable
and must be stricken." Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla.
1984). Although a property owner could bring an inverse condemnation action under Florida
law if the government denied a permit application, an action for damages was not necessary
when the denial of a rezoning application resulted in a taking. Id.
This distinction no longer appears to be valid. In First English, the Supreme Court
announced that "[i]nvalidation of the ordinance . . . is not a sufficient remedy to meet the
demands of the Just Compensation Clause." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987). The Court held that, if land
use regulation is invalidated because it violates the just compensation clause, even if the
government amends or withdraws the unconstitutional provision, this "subsequent action by
the government [will not] relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective." Id. at 2389. The First English Court made no distinction
between the "permit class" and the "zoning class" of unconstitutional land use regulations.
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ing of the property for public use without just compensation.12 ABC
alleges that requiring it to pay a fee or construct a road improvement
exceeding its traffic impact by 200%, is an unreasonable "subdivision
exaction[ ] which [is] so formidable as to deny the property owner of
all reasonable use of the property. 8s3 Finally, ABC argues that order-
ing ABC to construct a road improvement providing capacity for
three times as many trips as its project would generate may violate
Florida's dual rational nexus test for land dedication or for impact fee
payments exacted as a condition of development approval.8 4
The Supreme Court cited the rational nexus test with approval in
Nollan. The Court noted that the application of the dual rational
nexus test by the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida, in Town
of Longboat Key v. Land's End, Ltd.,85 was consistent with the
approach the Court used to reject the permit condition in Nollan.86
The Supreme Court found that the California Coastal Commission's
conditioning permit approval upon the Nollans' granting a lateral
access easement was completely unrelated to any " 'visual access'
82. For the assumption that ABC's takings claim is ripe and that the dimunition in value
is sufficient to support ABC's takings allegations, see supra note 78.
83. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
84. "Reasonable dedication or impact fee requirements are permissible so long as they
offset needs sufficiently attributable to the subdivision and so long as the funds collected are
sufficiently earmarked for the substantial benefit of the subdivision residents." Hollywood,
Inc., 431 So. 2d at 611; see also Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d
314 (Fla. 1976) (Municipalities can impose impact fees that do not exceed a proportionate
share of the anticipated costs of public improvements required to serve new development.);
Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (adopting the
Hollywood, Inc. dual rational nexus test); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.
2d 863 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (requiring a rational nexus between the subdivision exaction and
the proposed project's impact on the health, safety, and welfare of the community), cert.
denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1977). In 1985, the Florida Legislature codified the rational nexus
test and made it applicable to all local government land dedication and impact fee ordinances.
FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15)(e)] (1987).
In Hollywood, Inc., the court allocated the burden of proving both elements of the dual
rational nexus test to the government:
[T]he local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational
nexus, between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in
population generated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show
a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds
collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d at 611-12.
85. 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
86. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987). Longboat Key
adopted an ordinance requiring developers to dedicate land for city parks, or pay a fee in lieu
of dedication, as a condition of permit approval. Town of Longboat Key, 433 So. 2d at 575.
The court held the ordinance invalid under the dual rational nexus test because the ordinance
lacked "clear and adequate restrictions on the fees collected," and because the town failed to
show that "a proper nexus exist[ed] between the amount of land or money to be set aside and
the stated residential population requirements." Id. at 576.
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burden created by the proposed construction project.8 7 Specifically,
"a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to
walk across the Nollans' property [does not reduce] any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house.""8 Justice Scalia rejected
the approach of California courts in evaluating permit conditions 9
and cited twenty-one state court and two federal appellate court deci-
sions as consistent with the rationale nexus test used to invalidate the
permit condition in Nollan. 9°
87. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
88. Id.
89. California courts adhere to the "reasonable relationship test," initially proposed by the
California Supreme Court in Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). The
"reasonable relationship test considers whether the proposed development will contribute to
the problem sought to be alleviated by imposition of the regulation." Delaney, Gordon &
Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User
Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 148 (1987). Courts using the
reasonable relationship test defer to the legislature's judgment that the land dedication, or fee
in lieu of dedication, is required to protect the health, safety, and welfare of existing residents
and of the prospective residents of the proposed development. The Florida Third District
Court of Appeal stated: "The Ayres standard of 'reasonable relation' puts a heavy burden on
the developer to show that the required dedication bears no relation to the general health,
safety and welfare." Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1976).
When Justice Scalia alluded to the California approach, he was referring to the reasoning
in Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App.
1985), in which the appellate court relied on Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Ct. App. 1986). See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
107 S. Ct. 3141, 3144 (1987). Justice Scalia characterized the Grupe decision as follows:
In [Grupe], the court had found that so long as a project contributed to the need
for public access, even if the project standing alone had not created the need for
access, and even if there was only an indirect relationship between the access
exacted and the need to which the project contributed, imposition of an access
condition on a development permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by
the project to be constitutional.
Id. at 3144.
90. Id. at 3149. Justice Scalia claimed: "Our conclusion on this point is consistent with
the approach taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception
of the California state courts." Id. He then cited twenty-three cases in support of this
statement, including Town of Longboat Key v. Land's End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1983).
Although Justice Scalia stated that all twenty-three cases he cited adopted an approach
different than California's, several of the opinions used California's "reasonable relationship"
test. Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668, 673 (Colo.
1981); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Howard County v. JJM,
Inc., 301 Md. 256, 282, 482 A.2d 908, 921 (1984); State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County,
478 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo. 1972); Mackall v. White, 85 A.D.2d 696, 445 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487
(1981), appeal denied, 56 N.Y.2d 503, 435 N.E.2d 1100, 450 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1982); City of
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 806-07 (Tex. 1984); Call v. City of W.
Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Utah 1980).
Two of the decisions cited by Justice Scalia "adopted a test that is even more generous
than the reasonable relationship test as applied in California. This judicial deference test ...
establishes 'a virtually irrefutable presumption in favor of the exaction.' " Delaney, Gordon &
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City A's permit requirement will not constitute a taking under
the dual nexus test, as adopted in Florida and approved in Nollan,9" if
ABC Trust only pays its proportionate share of the cost of expanding
Fourth Avenue. The city should agree to reimburse ABC Trust for
two-thirds of ABC's cost to construct Fourth Avenue because the two
additional traffic lanes that ABC would build would carry three times
the amount of traffic generated by ABC's proposed project.92 Under
these circumstances the city should be able to demonstrate its compli-
ance with the dual rational nexus test.93 First, the city can prove a
rational nexus between the need to expand Fourth Avenue and the
additional traffic generated by ABC's proposed project. Second, if
Hess, supra note 89, at 154 (quoting Gordon, Subdivision Exactions Draw Challenges from
Developers, Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 2, 1985, at A14, col. 4). The test created in Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 36, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (1964), and
applied in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966), "provides for the automatic acceptance of a legislative determination in favor of an
exaction unless the developer produces evidence demonstrating that the exaction is
unreasonable." Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 89, at 154. Alternatively, "this test
requires a showing [by the government] only that the statute is substantially related to the
state's police powers. It does not require that the legislation be reasonably related to the
particular subdivision." Id. at 155.
Six other courts applied the "rational nexus" test. Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 653
(9th Cir. 1983); Town of Longboat Key v. Land's End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983); Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 12-13, 246 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1976); Simpson
v. City of N. Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980); Longridge Builders, Inc.
v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 350, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (1968); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
The remaining decisions cited by Justice Scalia either reasoned that an exaction is invalid
unless the burden placed on the landowner is "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
proposed development project, Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160
Conn. 109, 117-18, 273 A.2d 880, 885 (1970); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of
Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 68-69, 264 A.2d 910, 913-14 (1970), or did not rely on a specific test as
the basis for their decision. Schwing v. City of Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct. App.
1971), application denied, 259 La. 770, 252 So. 2d 667 (1971); Briar W., Inc. v. City of Lincoln,
206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d 730 (1980); J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12
(1981); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975). See also Littlefield
v. Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1986) (a federal civil rights action in which the court
cited with approval the "rational nexus" test as applied in Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1983)); Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 89, at 147-56 (the authors describe each test
and cite several of the cases shown above as applying the tests).
91. See supra notes 85, 86 & 90.
92. This procedure, known as a "refundable advance," is used when a developer constructs
an indivisible public improvement, even though the impact of the developer's project would
not require the full capacity of the improvement. The portion of the facility's cost paid by the
developer but not attributable to. the developer's project is refunded to the developer as other
property owners begin using the facility, or as the government collects sufficient impact fees or
other revenues. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 81-16, § 5-198(a)(5a) (Mar.
19, 1981); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., RESOLUTION 84-2178, § 4, policy 9(a)(4), (e)(l) (Sept.
18, 1984).
93. See supra note 84.
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ABC constructs the Fourth Avenue improvement and the city agrees
to refund ABC's excess costs in the fifth year of the city's capital
improvement program (or sooner if another project impacting Fourth
Avenue is approved before the fifth year),94 the city will show the
required nexus between the burden of the exaction and the benefits
accruing to the property owner.95
B. Second Hypothetical
The facts are the same as in the first hypothetical situation,
except that Fourth Avenue averages 30,100 trips per day prior to
ABC's proposal. Therefore, this four-lane divided street is operating
at LOS D,96 in excess of the service standard adopted in the City Traf-
fic Code, 97 even before the addition of 5,600 trips on Fourth Avenue
attributable to ABC's proposed project. 98 Accordingly, the city noti-
fies ABC that ABC must agree to build the road improvement or wait
four years for rezoning approval. The city does not offer to rezone
any portion of ABC's property.9 9 When ABC refuses to build the
road, the city denies ABC's rezoning request.
ABC brings an action for damages and for an injunction to
declare the City Traffic Code unconstitutional under the just compen-
sation clause.100 ABC claims that, because it cannot rezone any of its
property, "the regulation precludes all economically reasonable use of
94. If the city approves another project impacting Fourth Avenue, it should collect impact
fees from the owner of that project and reimburse ABC Trust. See supra notes 76 & 92.
95. If the City succeeds in proving both prongs of the dual rational nexus test, the Traffic
Code should not be declared invalid as applied to ABC Trust. In Nollan, the Supreme Court
cited Florida's rational nexus test with apparent approval. Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987). Therefore, if the city satisfies its burden of proof under
this test, its ordinance does not result in a taking of ABC's property. See supra notes 85, 86 &
90. Obviously, ABC should not receive damages under these circumstances either because the
Supreme Court in First English held that damages were only available if a court determined
that a regulation temporarily "worked a taking of all use of property." First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389
(1987).
96. See supra note 74.
97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
98. For the calculation of average daily trips attributable to ABC's proposed project, see
supra note 73.
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Because the road already exceeds the LOS
D threshold, any partial rezoning would violate the provisions of the City Traffic Code. Under
these circumstances, ABC can claim that it is deprived of all reasonable use of its property for
at least four years. The ripeness question is also satisfied because practically all development
proposals will generate traffic, and any proposal that generates traffic must be denied. For a
discussion of the ripeness issue and the requirement that the property owner "exhaust all
administrative remedies" prior to filing an action for inverse condemnation, see supra notes 40
& 78.
100. See supra notes 78 & 81.
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the property" 10' for at least four years. Second, ABC argues that no
rational nexus exists between the need to widen Fourth Avenue and
the traffic ABC's proposed development will generate because the
street needs to be enlarged according to the city's own standards,
1 2
even if ABC does not develop its property.
Prior to First English, a court could have found that because the
property value would only be diminished temporarily, the regulation
would not preclude all economically reasonable use of the property.
The New York Court of Appeals embraced this argument in Golden.
The Golden court held that because property owners were assured of
the right to build within eighteen years and could accelerate develop-
ment by constructing the needed public improvements earlier, the
town ordinance authorizing denial of subdivision applications if ade-
quate public facilities were not available, did not violate the just com-
pensation clause.'013
Justice Stevens advanced a similar argument in his dissent in
First English. Justice Stevens compared a land use restriction that
postponed development for a small fraction of the property's useful
life to a permanent restriction that reduced the property's value by an
equally small fraction.'" He reasoned that, just as a permanent regu-
lation must severely diminish property value to constitute a taking, a
severe temporary restriction must "remain in effect for a significant
percentage of the property's useful life."'
0 5
The First English majority agreed that temporary restrictions
must cause a substantial diminution in property value in order to con-
stitute a taking; 06 however, it did not specify any duration require-
ment.' 7 The majority held that, if a regulation adopted by a
101. Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla. 1981). In Graham, the
Florida Supreme Court stated that, even if a regulation is a valid exercise of the police power-
the regulation: (1) "promotes the health, safety, welfare or morals of the public," (2) is not
"arbitrarily or capriciously applied," and (3) "prevents a public harm" and does not "confer[ ]
a public benefit"-it may result in a taking, if the affected property is rendered "virtually
worthless." Id. at 1381.
102. The City Traffic Code is based on the finding that roads operating in excess of LOS C
are safety hazards and should be improved within five years. See, e.g., PALM BEACH COUNTY,
FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, art. II (Sept. 22, 1987).
103. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 382, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 155 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
104. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2395 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2394.
106. Id. at 2388.
107. Although the majority announced no time constraints, it did limit its holding to the
facts. Id. at 2389. The Court excluded "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes
in zoning ordinances, variances and the like." Id. It is unlikely that such normal delays would
postpone development for a significant portion of the property's useful life.
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government for an indefinite period °8 is subsequently determined to
be an invalid exercise of the police power, the restriction is a compen-
sable taking, even though it only temporarily deprives a landowner of
the use of his property. i0 9 On the other hand, in this hypothetical the
property owner is only precluded from using his property for four
years, according to the terms of the restriction. From the time of its
adoption, the restriction in this hypothetical is intended to expire in
four years, unlike the regulation in First English which could have
remained in effect indefinitely.
The First English opinion therefore provides little guidance if a
regulation has a fixed period of application from the outset. The opin-
ion, however, does not appear to create an exception for a regulation
that temporarily deprives owners of using their property by postpon-
ing approval of development permits." 0 Under Justice Stevens' rea-
soning, this hypothetical dispute would be easily resolved."' A
regulation that postpones rezoning approval for four years certainly
does not preclude all reasonable use of the property "for a significant
percentage of the property's useful life."
'"12
The Traffic Code can be upheld under the reasoning of the First
English majority, if the city "establish[es] that the denial of all use
was insulated as.a part of the State's authority to enact safety regula-
tions.""I3 Additionally, under Nollan, protecting the safety of motor-
ists and pedestrians by limiting new traffic on overcrowded roads is a
legitimate state interest." 4 The city, however, must demonstrate fur-
ther that the state interest in alleviating traffic congestion is substan-
tially advanced by conditioning approval of ABC's rezoning
108. Although the Los Angeles County flood protection ordinance was an interim measure,
it was not scheduled to expire on a specific date. Id. at 2381-82.
109. Id. at 2388-89.
110. The normal permit delay exception would probably not apply to a four-year delay in
approving a rezoning application. See supra note 107.
111. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
112. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2385. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
114. The Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners cited the following safety
concerns, in order to establish that the'Palm Beach County Traffic Performance Code is a valid
exercise of the police power.
(a) the requirements and standards of this Code are necessary for the safety
of the travelling public and are substantially related to furthering the public
benefit of safe travel,
(b) the accident rate resulting in property damage and injury increases as
the congestion increases on MAJOR THOROUGHFARES,
(c) fire, rescue, and law enforcement response times increase as congestion
increases on MAJOR THOROUGHFARES.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, 16th Whereas clause, at 3 (Sept. 22, 1987).
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application upon ABC's agreement to expand Fourth Avenue.' 5
In Nollan, the Court held that the California Coastal Commis-
sion's requirement that the Nollans' dedicate a public access easement
along the beach in order to receive a building permit was completely
unrelated to the legitimate state interest in preventing a solid wall of
houses from obstructing views of the beach from the road. "16 On the
other hand, in this hypothetical situation, the city's requirement that
ABC widen the road as a condition of rezoning approval is certainly
related to the legitimate government interest in reducing traffic con-
gestion.II The issue in this hypothetical case is not whether requiring
ABC Trust to construct the road as a condition of permit approval
substantially advances the legitimate state interest in reducing traffic
congestion."II Rather, the issue is whether the city can impose a con-
dition which the applicant admits substantially advances a legitimate
state interest, but contends is "so formidable as to deny the property
owner of all reasonable use of the property."' '
9
In order to establish that the exaction does not constitute a tak-
ing of ABC's property under Florida law, the city must demonstrate a
rational nexus between (1) the need for two additional traffic lanes
and the number of trips generated by ABC's proposed project, and (2)
ABC's cost to expand the road and the benefits accruing to ABC's
project. 120 The city can satisfy the first prong of the dual rational
nexus test by showing the connection between the need to expand
Fourth Avenue and the additional traffic congestion generated by
ABC's project.
The city, however, must revise its permit conditions in order to
satisfy the second prong of the dual rational nexus test because the
existing traffic congestion above the LOS C standard is not attributa-
ble to ABC's project,' 21 and ABC's impact alone is insufficient to war-
115. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146-47 (1987).
116. Id. at 3148-49.
117. Table One of the Palm Beach Traffic Performance Code shows that at LOS D the
capacity of a six-lane divided road exceeds the capacity of a four-lane divided road by 16,400
trips per day. PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 87-18, art. V, § 2(A)(3) table 1
(Sept. 22, 1987). When the volume/capacity ratio of a road declines, the number of accidents
and the response times for emergency services decrease. See supra note 114.
118. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
119. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 n.6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). A
valid exercise of the police power may result in a taking, if it renders affected property
"virtually worthless." Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981). See
supra note 101.
120. Hollywood, Inc.,'431 So. 2d at 611-12; see also FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15)(e) (1987).
121. Fourth Avenue currently carries 30,100 trips per day. This exceeds LOS C by 100
trips. See supra note 74.
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rant the construction of two additional traffic lanes. 122 The city can
satisfy this burden by refunding the portion of ABC's construction
cost not attributable to and not benefitting ABC's project. 123 Specifi-
cally, if the cost of building a two-mile, two-lane project roadway is
$1,200,000,124 and if ABC constructs the improvement at its own
expense, the city should repay ABC $790,244.125 The city should
repay the cost attributable to the existing congestion immediately.1
26
Further, the city should repay the cost attributable to future develop-
ments as the developments are approved, but no later than the fifth
year of the city's capital improvement program when the city had
planned to widen Fourth Avenue.
127
C. Third Hypothetical
The first two hypotheticals assume ABC Trust will sue City A
upon denial of ABC's rezoning application. In hypothetical three, the
city denies ABC's rezoning application due to traffic problems on
Fourth Avenue. 128 ABC waits four years and reapplies for rezoning
approval. The city denies this second rezoning application because
the city has not complied with its own capital improvement plan, and
because the city has not scheduled Fourth Avenue to be expanded for
another five years.' 29  The city instructs ABC that ABC either can
122. See supra note 80.
123. See supra note 92.
124. See supra note 79.
125. When the total construction cost of $1,200,000 is divided by 16,400 trips-the
difference in capacity between a four-lane divided road and a six-lane divided road at LOS D-
the cost per trip equals $73.17. The cost allocation (rounded to total 100%) is as follows:
Cost attributable to ABC's project = 5,600 trips X $73.17 = $ 409,756
Cost attributable to existing congestion = 100 trips X $73.17 = $ 7,317
Cost attributable to future development = 10,700 trips x $7,317 = $ 782,972
TOTAL COST = 16,400 trips X $73.17 = $1,200,000
126. This amount cannot be charged to ABC or to future development under the second
prong of the dual rational nexus test. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606,
611-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see also, BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., RESOLUTION 84-2178, § 3,
policy 5, § 4, policy 9(e)(2) (Sept. 18, 1984).
127. See supra note 94.
128. For the purposes of this hypothetical, it does not matter whether Fourth Avenue was
operating at LOS C or LOS D when ABC requested rezoning approval.
129. This hypothetical differs from the Palm Beach County Ordinance. The Palm Beach
Traffic Performance Code provides "that the County's failure to maintain its commitment to
adhere to and implement the Palm Beach County Five-Year Road Program Ordinance shall
result in a suspension of the standards contained in this Code." PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA.,
ORDINANCE 87-18, art. II (Sept. 22, 1987). However, the Act does not provide for suspension
of capital facility performance standards merely because a local government fails to construct
capital facilities as scheduled in its capital improvement element. FLA. STAT.
§§ 163.3177(3)(b), -.3177(10)(h), -.3202(2)(a) (Supp. 1986). Therefore, the Palm Beach
County Traffic Code suspension provision may violate the Act.
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wait an additional four years 30 or agree -to construct the road
improvement as a condition of rezoning approval. When ABC refuses
to build the' road, the city denies ABC's zoning request.
ABC files an action for an injunction and for damages on the
grounds that the Traffic Code is invalid as applied to ABC's property.
ABC argues that, under the First English decision, it is entitled to
compensation for the period during which the city has denied ABC all
reasonable use of its property.' 3' ABC also notes that the New York
Court of Appeals, in Golden, had stated that the Ramapo ordinance
would have violated the just compensation clause, if the town had
failed to comply with its capital improvement program.' 32
This third hypothetical situation differs from the first two pri-
marily because the city's actions deprive ABC Trust of the use of its
property for at least eight years, even though the city advised ABC
that it would be precluded from rezoning for only four years.
According to ABC, the city's actions in further postponing develop-
ment on ABC's property interfere with ABC's investment-backed
expectations, "[a]nother factor which may be considered in determin-
ing the reasonableness of an exercise of the police power." '133 ABC
argues that it planned to rezone its property four years after the city
initially denied the rezoning application. Furthermore, ABC argues
that the city's failure to comply with its own capital improvement
program will result in postponing development on ABC's property for
at least eight years. Therefore, by initially advising ABC that its
property could be rezoned in year four, and then denying ABC's sec-
ond rezoning request until year eight, the city "so frustrate[s] distinct
investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking.' " 34 ABC
130. See supra note 77.
131. First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2389 (1987).
132. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 373 n.7, 285 N.E.2d 291, 299 n.7,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 148 n.7 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). The New York
Court of Appeals upheld Ramapo's zoning ordinance on "the assumption that the program
will be fully and timely implemented." Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
The court, however, stated that, if the city did not comply with its capital improvement
program schedule, "the aggrieved landowner can seek relief ... declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional as applied to his property." Id. at 373 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 299 n.7, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 148 n.7. The court went on to explain that "should it arise at some future point in
time that the Town must fail in its enterprise, an action for a declaratory judgment will indeed
prove the most effective vehicle for relieving property owners of what would constitute
absolute prohibitions." Id.
133. Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1383 (Fla. 1981). The United States
Supreme Court stated that one of three factors of "particular significance" in identifying a
taking "is the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
134. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
1223
1224 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1203
concludes by demanding the rezoning be granted and that it receive
damages for the period of time that the city denied all reasonable use
of ABC's property.' 35
The investment-backed expectations test does not require ABC
to prove that the city is estopped from denying its rezoning applica-
tion. 136 Furthermore, the test does not require ABC Trust to show
that it has a vested right to a rezoning in year four.' 37 The Florida
Supreme Court has treated this test as if it required the property
owner to prove the equivalent of a vested rights or estoppel claim.
3 8
135. See First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2389 (1987).
136. Professor Mandelker attributes the addition of the investment-backed expectations
factor to the judicial lexicon of the takings clause, to Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn
Central. Mandelker, Investment Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 (1987). He questions whether Justice Brennan's failure to "mention either
the estoppel or vested rights doctrines in Penn Central ... may indicate that investment in
backed expectations must be considered even when they do not create an estoppel or a vested
right." Id. at 5-6. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). In Kaiser
Aetna, government officials initially notified property owners that they could construct an
improvement without a permit. Id. at 167. Government officials subsequently required
permits and conditioned permit approval on the grant of an easement. Id. at 167-68. The
Court found that the government was not estopped from enforcing the permit requirements,
but the change in regulations did interfere with the property owners' reasonable investment-
backed expectations to such an extent as to constitute a taking of the easement. Id. at 179.
In Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976), the
Florida Supreme Court held that a government may be estopped from changing its regulations
if "a property owner (1) in good faith (2) upon some act or omission of government (3) has
made such a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and
expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he acquired." Id.
at 15-16.
137. A property owner must demonstrate that he has performed substantial work and
incurred substantial liability in reliance on a governmental permit approval, in order to
establish a vested right to complete construction in accordance with the approved permit. F.
SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE 544 (1984).
138. See Graham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981). In Estuary Properties,
the Florida Supreme Court distinguished Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and Navigation
Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965), and Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977), in which the state's denial of
dredge and fill permits constituted takings, inter alia, because permit denial interfered with the
property owners' reasonable expectations that they would be permitted to fill their property.
Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1383. In Zabel and Gables-By-The- Sea, the state sold the
property owners submerged land, knowing that the "lands were totally useless without the
right to fill them." 399 So. 2d at 1381. The property owner's "expectation was further
supported in Zabel by a statutory right to fill which existed when the property was purchased.
Estuary Properties, on the other hand, had only its own subjective expectation that the land
could be developed in the manner it now proposes." Id. at 1383.
One commentator argued that, by distinguishing Estuary Properties from Zabel and
Gables-By-The-Sea, the Florida Supreme Court "equat[ed] investment-backed expectations
with vested rights, a position clearly in conflict with Penn Central." Bricklemyer, The Florida
Test for Taking A Critical Analysis of Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., FLA. B.J., Feb. 1983,
at 87, 89. Bricklemyer argued that although the issue was "whether the regulation denied the
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In order to satisfy its burden of proof under Florida's version of the
investment-backed expectations test,139 ABC must show (1) a specific
city act that authorized ABC to undertake a particular development
plan, (2) substantial reliance on the city's act, (3) good faith, and (4)
that the rights ABC would lose if the city is allowed to postpone
development approval "are substantial enough to make it fundamen-
tally unfair to eliminate those rights.""
ABC may have difficulty establishing that the city's adoption of
the capital improvement element of its comprehensive plan, including
a construction schedule showing that Fourth Avenue would be com-
pleted during the fourth year of the plan, was a specific act authoriz-
ing ABC to undertake a particular type of development. Generally, a
developer must show that the municipality has issued a building per-
mit. 14 ' A city's failure to rezone property, even if it had previously
adopted a plan indicating its intent to rezone, is not a specific govern-
mental act authorizing a developer to undertake a particular develop-
ment plan. 4 2 Furthermore, ABC may be unable to demonstrate its
substantial reliance on the city's capital improvement program sched-
ule. In order to demonstrate substantial reliance, ABC must show
that it has spent sufficient funds to render the city's inaction "highly
inequitable and injust."'
' 43
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 44 the Supreme Court stated
that changes in governmental regulations that frustrate reasonable
investment-backed expectations may effect a taking of property, even
in the absence of a vested right or an estoppel. 45 Nevertheless, many
courts, including Florida's, require that developers demonstrate the
elements of an estoppel or vested rights claim to establish that govern-
mental action has unduly interfered with their investment-backed
owner a reasonably expected return on his investment," the court "focused on the estoppel
aspect of the expectations issue." Id. at 91 n.51.
139. Other courts have also equated investment-backed expectations with the estoppel or
vested rights doctrines. See Mandelker, supra note 136, at 37-40.
140. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, supra note 137, at 545.
141. Id. at 545, 547, 549. In Florida, a developer's rights can vest on the issuance of a
special or conditional-use permit. See City of Miami v. 20th Century Club, Inc., 313 So. 2d
448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); City of North Miami v. Marguilis, 289 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA
1974).
142. Mandelker, supra note 136, at 31-32, 37-38. See also Pasco County v. Tampa Dev.
Corp., 364 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
143. City of Fort Pierce v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). See also
Mandelker, supra note 136, at 37.
144. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
145. Id. at 179. But see Mandelker, supra note 136, at 37-43 (a persuasive argument that
the investment-backed expectations factor would have a more meaningful role if it
incorporated vested rights doctrine into takings law).
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expectations. 146.,,It is doubtful that ABC can prove it has a vested
right to rezone its property in year four, or that the city is estopped
from denying its zoning request. 147 If ABC cannot argue successfully
that the city's valid regulation is actually a temporary regulatory tak-
ing which interferes with ABC's investment backed expectations, the
result in hypothetical three will be the same as the first two hypotheti-
cal situations. ABC must establish that the city's regulation consti-
tutes a temporary regulatory taking because the city failed to widen
Fourth Avenue in accordance with its original capital improvement
program.
V. CONCLUSION
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 148 should not affect
local government implementation of development exaction and
impact fee systems or judicial evaluation of these systems in Florida.
Despite some commentators' hopes,' 49 the Supreme Court did not
adopt a uniform federal test for evaluating development exactions and
impact fees. 150 The Court's failure to distinguish among the three
major tests used to evaluate exactions left Florida's dual rational
nexus test intact.'' Consequently, municipalities that condition
development permit approval upon fee payments or improvement
construction by developers will continue to measure their programs
against precedents developed by Florida courts and codified by the
Florida Legislature. Specifically, local governments implementing the
Act must ensure that they can defend their development regulations
under the dual rational nexus test. 1
52
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles '" changes the Florida rule denying damages for con-
fiscatory zoning regulations, but permits compensation as a remedy
for unreasonable permit denials. 54 First English also rejects the local
government argument that a land use regulation that temporarily pre-
cludes all use of private property never takes property if the owner
will eventually be permitted to use the property.' 55 Government regu-
146. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
148. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
149. Delaney, Gordon & Hess, supra note 89, at 145 n.44.
150. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 85-86 & 90 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 84.
153. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
154. See supra note 81.
155. See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
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lators, however, can continue to argue that the regulation is necessary
to preserve the public safety. ,
5 6
.Local governments can comply with the Act but avoid takings
claims by carefully drafting and administering land development reg-
ulations. Impact fee and development exaction regulations should be
based on the extensive capital facilities studies suggested by the
state. 5 7 Exactions should be administered to ensure that developers
who construct required capital improvements do not pay more than
their fair share. 5 Finally, governments must adequately fund capital
improvement programs and tailor construction schedules to avoid
denying property owners all use of their property for extended periods
of time.
DENNIS MELE
156. See supra notes 41-42 & 113-14 and accompanying text.
157. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J -5.016(1), (2) (1986).
158. See, e.g., supra note 92 and acccompanying text.
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